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GOVERNING CYBERSECURITY: THE SEC ENTERS
THE RING
INTRODUCTION
Modern businesses and securities trading systems rely on high-speed digital
communication technologies. One of these digital technologies, electronic
information storage, has become a source of great liability. Electronic
information storage is standard for most industries because it is a highly
efficient method of storing and accessing large volumes of information.1 Even
sensitive data, such as medical records and financial information, is
increasingly stored electronically.2
With increased reliance comes increased vulnerability. The more
businesses and securities traders increase their use of electronic information
storage, the more susceptible they become to cybersecurity breaches called
“cyberattacks.” A cyberattack is a “deliberate [action] to alter, disrupt, deceive,
degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks or the information and/or
programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks.”3 Cybersecurity
breaches affect the entire economy because breaches impact both consumer
confidence in businesses and the integrity of trading systems. The frequency of
cyberattacks has increased over the past decade and will likely continue to
increase as hackers become more advanced.4 This trend has not gone unnoticed
by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) or the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”).
This Perspective will seek to explain how the FTC and SEC can regulate
cybersecurity measures without redundancy and to suggest compliance
strategies for regulated entities. To accomplish these goals, this Perspective

1 Use of Electronic Accounting Software Records: Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-%26-Self-Employed/Useof-Electronic-Accounting-Software-Records%3B-Frequently-Asked-Questions-and-Answers.
2 Benefits of Electronic Health Records (EHRs), HEALTHIT.GOV (July 30, 2015), https://www.healthit.
gov/providers-professionals/benefits-electronic-health-records-ehrs.
3 Comm. on Offensive Info. Warfare, et. al., Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S.
Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL 1 (William A. Owens, et. al. eds.,
2009), http://www.nap.edu/read/12651/chapter/1.
4 McAfee Labs, Threats Predictions, MCAFEE (Oct. 20, 2015 10:03 AM), http://www.mcafee.com/us/
resources/misc/infographic-threats-predictions-2015.pdf.
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will explain how the FTC and SEC began regulating cybersecurity measures,
compare the SEC’s and FTC’s involvement in cybersecurity regulation, and
ultimately discuss how the agencies’ increasing focus on cybersecurity will
impact corporate governance and accountability.
I. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
Since 1996, the Federal Trade Commission has been interested in
regulating companies’ cybersecurity measures.5 The FTC sees itself as a law
enforcement agency that protects consumers by educating businesses and
consumers about privacy and security issues.6
The FTC draws its cybersecurity enforcement power from Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (“Section 5”) which prohibits unfair or
deceptive business practices.7 In order to protect consumer privacy, the FTC
takes measures to ensure that companies protect any consumer information
they gather. The FTC promulgated its first rules on cybersecurity measures in
2000 and has been issuing rules as well as offering workshops on cybersecurity
ever since.8 The rules, such as the Privacy of Consumer Financial Information
Rule, generally require institutions to provide consumers with notice of their
privacy policies.9
Since 2002, the FTC has brought over fifty enforcement actions under
Section 5 based on failure to implement “reasonable” data security systems.10
These cases include cases against Snapchat, Inc., Atlanta Falcons Football
Club, LLC, and Verizon, Inc.11 Because the FTC is consumer focused, its
primary goal is to protect personal information and build consumer confidence
in the market place.12 To achieve this goal, the FTC’s enforcement actions
generally require companies to take comprehensive measures to increase
security and repair any harm done to their customers.13 The FTC primarily
5 FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2014/privacydatasecurityupdate_2014.pdf.
6 Id.
7 Daniel F. Shubert et al., The SEC’s Two Primary Theories in Cybersecurity Enforcement Actions, THE
CYBERSECURITY LAW REPORT (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/
Editorial/Publications/Documents/the-secs-two-primary-theories-in-cybersecurity-enforcement-actions.pdf.
8 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5.
9 FTC Privacy of Consumer Financial Information Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 313 (2000).
10 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5.
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focuses on institutions that collect sensitive data about consumers, such as
medical and financial institutions.14 The agency investigates companies’
cybersecurity measures to determine whether they are adequate enough to
protect sensitive consumer information. Unfortunately for businesses seeking
clear guidelines, the FTC has maintained a flexible definition of what
constitutes “reasonable” security safeguards.15 However, by not clearly
defining a checklist of technologies required by businesses to be in compliance
with FTC standards, the FTC has been able to quickly adapt its regulations to
new, advancing threats. On the whole, the FTC goes to great lengths to be
proactive about enforcement.16 In addition to its rules, the FTC regularly
maintains blogs and workshops that educate and alert both businesses and
consumers to cybersecurity threats.17 Companies interested in keeping up with
FTC’s evolving industry guidance can easily access these blogs and workshops
through the FTC’s website.18
II. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Although the SEC has only recently become interested in cybersecurity, it
has made protecting registered investment companies’ (“RIC”) customer’s
electronic information a priority.19 These RICs include publicly traded
corporations and the investment companies that broker their shares. As a result,
the definition of ‘customer’ has a narrower meaning for the SEC than it does
for the FTC. Unlike the FTC, which focuses on protecting the common
consumers’ information, the SEC seeks to protect stockholders’ sensitive
information.20 By forcing RICs to disclose cybersecurity risk information in
addition to actual breaches, the SEC seeks to ensure that stockholders are being
properly informed.

14

Id.
Heidi Milic & Thomas Blackburn, What Is “Reasonable” Data Security According to the FTC?,
CLAIMS MANAGEMENT (Oct. 5, 2015), http://claims-management.theclm.org/home/article/What-IsReasonable-Data-Security-According-to-the-FTC.
16 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5.
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, Consumer Information Blog, (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.consumer.
ftc.gov/blog.
19 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, EXAMINATION PRIORITIES FOR 2015 3 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/
about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2015.pdf.
20 Compare FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE (2014) (stating the FTC
is charged with protecting consumers), with U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, EXAMINATION PRIORITIES FOR
2015 (stating the SEC’s mission includes investor protection, capital formation, and maintaining fair markets).
15
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The SEC’s entrance into cybersecurity regulation was in some ways a
natural progression from prior SEC regulations. For example, in 2000 the SEC
promulgated the Privacy of Consumer Financial Information Rule
(“Regulation S-P”).21 Known as the “safeguards rule,” Regulation S-P requires
regulated entities to “adopt written policies and procedures reasonably
designed to protect customer records and information.”22 With the shift to
electronic records, Regulation S-P evolved to require firms to adopt policies
and procedures, namely cybersecurity measures, designed to protect electronic
records.23 The SEC’s power over cybersecurity regulation grew after the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DFA”) was passed
in 2010.24 The DFA transferred some regulatory power from the FTC to the
SEC by requiring covered entities to develop identity theft programs that
would detect and analyze possible identity theft incidents.25 These
requirements allowed the SEC to explore its authority to regulate the
cybersecurity measures used by regulated entities. The agency’s first action
was the issuance of cybersecurity disclosure guidelines in 2011.26 In the
disclosure guidelines the SEC expanded the power it gained from the DFA. It
noted that although no existing rule plainly mentioned cybersecurity, many of
its rules could be interpreted to require registered investment companies to
disclose cybersecurity risks and incidents.27 The SEC went on to suggest that
RICs should disclose the risk of “cyber incidents” and review the adequacy of
their disclosures on an ongoing basis.28 Although the idea of an agency boldly
regulating where it had never regulated before is troubling, agencies must
evolve to meet rapidly changing threats within their jurisdiction. The SEC
seems to be within a reasonable interpretation of its jurisdiction and prior
regulations, such as Regulation S-P, because investors would be unable to
properly evaluate the risks associated with investing in a company without
knowing about its cybersecurity measures.
21

Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 17 C.F.R. § 248 (2000).
SEC Charges Investment Adviser with Failing to Adopt Proper Cybersecurity Policies and Procedures
Prior to Breach, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015202.html.
23 Id.
24 Shubert et al., supra note 7, at 4.
25 Id.
26 David B. H. Martin et al., SEC Activity Trends in Cybersecurity and Securities Law, INSIDE COUNSEL
(Oct. 4, 2015, 10:01 AM), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/04/14/sec-activity-trends-in-cybersecurity-andsecurities.
27 CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.
sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm.
28 Id.
22
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The SEC has investigated many entities within its jurisdiction and officially
made cybersecurity a priority for 2015 going forward.29 Early SEC comment
letters suggested that the SEC was primarily interested in how companies
disclose their cybersecurity measures.30 However, recent regulations and
official comments have shown an interest in controlling the actual procedures
companies take to protect customer information.31 Under recent regulations,
such as the Fair Disclosure rule (Regulation FD), RICs must develop
procedures to address administrative, technical, and physical safeguards
reasonably designed to protect against unauthorized access to customer
information.32 In November 2014, the SEC promulgated the Systems
Compliance and Integrity rule (“Regulation SCI”).33 Regulation SCI assessed
the new problems presented by various new high-speed communication
technologies being utilized by national securities exchanges.34 Regulation SCI
also increased the SEC’s ability to oversee the cybersecurity measures of RICs
by imposing an obligation on RICs to actively monitor their systems and
prevent cyberattacks.35 The SEC has jurisdiction over an RIC’s cybersecurity
measures because any unauthorized access to stockholder or customer
information harms the financial well-being of RIC stock holders.36
III. FTC VS. SEC
At first glance, it may seem redundant to have both the FTC and SEC
regulating cybersecurity. Both agencies 1) require regulated entities to
implement cybersecurity programs that contain administrative, technical, and
physical safeguards, and 2) are concerned about the impact of cyberattacks.37
Additionally, the FTC has been regulating cybersecurity for much longer than
the SEC and thus has much more experience on the subject. As a result, it may
seem like a waste of resources for the SEC to take over a relatively small,
albeit important, part of the cybersecurity realm when such an experienced
agency exists to police cybersecurity. However, there are three important

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 19, at 3.
Shubert et al., supra note 7, at 2.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5.
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differences between the FTC and the SEC that justify the SEC’s entrance into
cybersecurity regulation.
A. Different Focus
Although both the FTC and SEC are concerned about what companies do
with consumer information, the FTC is focused on the impact to the individual
consumer.38 On the other hand, the SEC is primarily focused on the manner
companies disclose their cybersecurity measures to shareholders and the
content of the disclosures.39 As discussed in Part II, the ‘customer’ that the
agencies are concerned about is inherently different due to jurisdictional
differences.40 Although the SEC has only recently began investigating the
substance of cybersecurity measures, it has concentrated on controlling the
methods with which companies determine and disclose material breaches.
Much like the SEC’s definition of material information in Basic v. Levinson,
the meaning of “material breach” is quite broad.41 Essentially, a cybersecurity
breach is a “material breach” if it is substantial enough that an investor would
want to know about it.42 The SEC does provide some guidance by giving
examples of material breaches such as customer information or secret
intellectual property being stolen during a cybersecurity breach.43 SEC rules
are therefore immediately important to corporate governance because they
require companies to have a system in place for determining whether a breach
is a material breach and alerting shareholders if it is.
B. Different Jurisdictions
The FTC and SEC do not share the same jurisdiction. While the SEC has
jurisdiction over publicly traded companies and other RICs, the FTC has
jurisdiction over nearly every entity that conducts business in the United

38

FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5.
Shubert et al., supra note 7, at 2.
40 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 19, at 1.
41 Compare Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (Information is material if there is a
“substantial likelihood” that a “reasonable investor” would find it important in making an investment decision
or if the information would substantially alter the “total mix” of information available), with U.S. SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM’N, CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2 (2011) (Cybersecurity disclosure requirements are
designed to elicit information about risks and events that “a reasonable investor would consider important”).
42 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 27.
43 Id.
39
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States.44 Accordingly, a broad reading of Section 5 could give the FTC the
power to regulate the security of stockholder information as well as general
consumer information. However, when Congress passed the Exchange Act and
created the SEC it took the regulation of securities-based issues from the FTC
and placed it in the hands of the SEC. Through the Exchange Act, Congress
granted the SEC a broader delegation of power to address securities-specific
problems than the FTC possessed. 45 Therefore, Section 5 does not likely give
the FTC jurisdiction over issues that pose a threat to stockholders and
securities trading, such as material breaches. These issues are reasonably
within SEC jurisdiction because material breaches hurt stockholders’
investments. On the other hand, the FTC’s cybersecurity regulations will
inevitably control publicly traded companies because they collect consumer
information.
With a different focus and jurisdiction than the FTC, the SEC has plenty of
room to fulfill a meaningful purpose in cybersecurity regulation. The SEC’s
focus on cybersecurity measures of publicly traded companies will lead to
more transparency in investment markets and may allow the FTC to focus its
resources on monitoring cybersecurity measures used by companies outside the
SEC’s jurisdiction.
C. Different Strategies
In action and in word, the FTC seeks to maintain “reasonableness” in its
enforcement actions by considering a company’s reaction to a cybersecurity
breach.46 The SEC may not be so forgiving. The Commission proved as much
in its first cybersecurity enforcement action.47 Although there was no
indication of financial harm to investors, the SEC censured and fined an
investment firm $75,000 for violating the “safeguards rule.”48 By fining an
RIC even when there was no indication of financial harm, the SEC believes it
will incentivize firms to anticipate, rather than react, to cybersecurity
breaches.49 Like the FTC, the SEC requires regulated entities to detect,
prevent, and remediate cybersecurity faults. However, the SEC also obligates
44 The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 5, 2015, 10:06
AM), https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml; About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 5, 2015, 10:01 AM),
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc.
45 COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 8–9 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 7th ed. 2013).
46 Milicic & Blackburn, supra note 15.
47 R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt, Inc., S.E.C. Release No. 4204 (2015), 2015 WL 5560846.
48 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 22.
49 Id.
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RICs to make extensive disclosures whether a cyberattack occurred or not. An
RIC’s obligation does not end with regular disclosures that outline its
cybersecurity risk factors and disclosures following cyberattacks. The SEC
mandates that RICs have a procedure for auditing previous disclosures to
ensure their accuracy in the light of the most recent disclosure.50
On balance, there are three important differences between the FTC and the
SEC that make room for both of them to regulate cybersecurity. The agencies
have different focuses, jurisdictions, and enforcement strategies. With both
agencies regulating cybersecurity, more people are protected and consumers as
well as investors will have more trust in the marketplace.
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CYBERSECURITY
The aforementioned distinctions present unique obstacles for corporations
when developing internal governance procedures. Companies that fear damage
to their reputation and worth by disclosing cybersecurity threats should weigh
that risk against the heavy weight of the hammer awaiting those who do not
comply. To comply with both FTC and SEC cybersecurity regulations, a
corporation must focus on adopting a corporate structure that facilitates
accuracy, accountability, and communication. Both the FTC and SEC require
regulated entities to implement cybersecurity programs that contain
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards.51 However, the agencies’
divergent focuses and enforcement techniques broaden the range of a regulated
corporation’s liabilities. One breach may expose corporations to dual liability.
Following a breach, the FTC might examine a company’s cybersecurity
measures to determine if they were reasonably adequate. At the same time, the
SEC might compare the impact of the breach with how a corporation has
represented its cybersecurity measures in past and present disclosures.
A corporate governance model that creates high-speed communication
avenues for alerting management to cybersecurity threats and breaches is
essential to meeting SEC and FTC requirements. This model must contain a
structure for monitoring cybersecurity measures and determining which
breaches are material breaches. It is important that the officers who certify
disclosures are adequately informed because any downplaying of cybersecurity
attacks is possible grounds for a SEC enforcement action. Such a model has

50
51

Shubert et al., supra note 7, at 1.
Id.; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5.
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two advantages for corporations. By increasing internal accountability, a
corporation incentivizes management to stay apprised of cybersecurity
measures. Additionally, as a result of customers and investors perceiving that
the market is safer, revenues and stock prices may rise. Thus, the cost of such a
corporate model may be offset by the returns from the sense of security it gives
customers and investors.
FORREST E. LIND III
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